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Judicial Interference with
Effective Assistance of Counsel
Bennett L. Gershman*
I.

Introduction

Of all the rights that an accused person possesses, the
right to counsel is by far the most important because it affects
the ability to assert all other rights. A defendant‟s right to
counsel, guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, has long been
understood to include the right to the effective assistance of
counsel.1 However, the standard for “effective assistance” in
defending a client is complex and controversial. In Strickland
v. Washington,2 the Supreme Court set out the analytical
framework for deciding claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel. “The benchmark for judging any claim of
ineffectiveness,” the Court said, “must be whether counsel‟s
conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the
adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having
produced a just result.”3 Counsel‟s effectiveness can be
impaired by both internal and external constraints. For
example, a defendant‟s right to effective counsel can be violated
because of counsel‟s own personal failings and mistakes. A
lawyer who is drunk or sleeping during a trial may be unable
to render effective advocacy.4 By the same token, a lawyer may
be incapable of rendering effective assistance who is so
professionally incompetent that his representation falls below
the standard of objective reasonableness, which is the standard

* Professor of Law, Pace Law School.
1. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 654 (1984).
2. 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (citing McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771
n.14 (1970)).
3. Id. at 686.
4. Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc)
(presumption of prejudice based on counsel‟s sleeping during prosecution‟s
presentation of scientific evidence in rape trial).
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articulated by the Court in Strickland.5 However, even if
counsel is professionally competent and not suffering from
personal deficiencies that would impair sound representation,
his ability to defend his client effectively may nevertheless be
impeded by external factors that may affect counsel‟s advocacy
in ways that violate both the defendant‟s Sixth Amendment
right to counsel and his Due Process right to a fair trial.6
Probably the most damaging external impediment to a
lawyer‟s ability to render effective assistance to a client may
come from the interference by the trial judge in counsel‟s
advocacy. A judge supervises the conduct of a trial but he is
more than a mere umpire or moderator. A trial judge, by his
rulings, questions, and comments, has an enormous capacity to
affect the merits of a party‟s case and thereby influence the
verdict of the jury.7 To be sure, the basic requirement of a trial
judge, both legally and ethically, is to be impartial in demeanor
as well as in actions.8 However, some judges deviate from this
precept of neutrality, and through inadvertence or willfulness,
5. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 (deficient performance “requires showing
that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
„counsel‟ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment”).
6. A defendant has a right to counsel of his choice. See Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932) (“[T]he right to counsel being conceded, a
defendant should be afforded a fair opportunity to secure counsel of his own
choice.”). Nevertheless, a judge in administering a trial has broad discretion
to make rulings that may frustrate a defendant‟s choice of counsel. For
example, denying a defendant the right to have an attorney appear pro hac
vice implicates constitutional concerns, but is within a court‟s broad
discretion to ensure competent and ethical lawyering. See United States v.
Ries, 100 F.3d 1469 (9th Cir. 1996) (denial of application of out-of-state
attorney to appear pro hac vice is within the court‟s discretion to ensure
competent and ethical lawyering). Similarly, no abuse of discretion is found
when a judge denies a last-minute continuance to obtain substitute counsel.
See United States v. Armstrong, 112 F.3d 342, 345 (8th Cir. 1997). The right
to counsel includes the right to self-representation. See Faretta v. California,
422 U.S. 806, 836 (1975) (“In forcing [defendant], under these circumstances,
to accept against his will a state-appointed public defender, the [trial court]
deprived him of his constitutional right to conduct his own defense.”).
7. Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 470 (1933) (“The influence of
the trial judge on the jury is necessarily and properly of great weight and his
lightest word or intimation is received with deference, and may prove
controlling.”) (internal citation omitted).
8. Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954) (“justice must satisfy
the appearance of justice”).
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engage in conduct that subverts a lawyer‟s ability to effectively
defend his client. A judge has broad discretion to administer a
trial and supervise the flow of the evidence and the conduct of
the attorneys. However, this broad discretion does not
authorize a judge to improperly impede defense counsel‟s
representation in ways that destroy a defendant‟s right to a fair
trial and the effective assistance of his attorney. When a trial
judge improperly interferes with counsel‟s representation, to
the extent that the defendant suffers substantial prejudice, an
appellate court may conclude that a defendant‟s right to
effective assistance of counsel has been violated and the
conviction will be reversed.
II. People v. Borukhova
The issue of judicial interference with the right to effective
assistance of counsel arose dramatically in a recent and highly
publicized New York State murder trial. In People v.
Borukhova,9 the defendant, Mazultov Borukhova, along with a
co-defendant, Mikhail Mallayev, were convicted of shooting to
death Borukhova‟s husband, Daniel Malakov, in a Queens
playground in front of their four-year-old daughter. The crime
received enormous press coverage, and the media quickly
focused on Borukhova as a probable suspect.10 Following an
investigation, she was charged with murder on the theory that
she hired Mallayev to kill her husband. The evidence against
Mallayev as the shooter was substantial; his fingerprints were
found on a silencer discovered at the crime scene11 and he was
9. No. 2009-04153 (Queens Cnty. Apr. 21, 2009).
10. See, e.g., Nicholas Hirshon, Queens’ Most Significant Events in ’07,
N.Y.
DAILY
NEWS,
Jan.
22,
2008,
http://www.nydailynews.com/ny_local/queens/2007/12/30/2007-1230_queens_most_significant_events_in_07.html; Tim Bukher et al., Cops
Probe Calls of Slain Doc’s Ex-Wife, N.Y. POST, Oct. 30, 2007,
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/regional/cops_probe_calls_of_slain_doc_ex_0Iq
Mue9XDR0VD2DhfgofIJ;
Tamer El-Ghobashy et al., Mom of Slain Dentist Certain Son’s Ex-Wife is to
Blame,
N.Y.
DAILY
NEWS,
Oct.
30,
2007,
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/ny_crime/2007/10/30/2007-1030_mom_of_slain_dentist_certain_sons_exwife.html.
11. Transcript of Record at 2104-07, 2282, People v. Borukhova, No.
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identified as the shooter by a witness in the playground.12 The
case against Borukhova was weaker; she was related to
Mallayev through marriage, was alleged to have had a motive
to gain custody of her daughter, and had made numerous
telephone calls to Mallayev‟s cell phone around the time of the
shooting.13
The trial lasted six weeks and involved several hotly
contested evidentiary rulings that affected Borukhova‟s ability
to present her defense intelligently.14 The rulings by the trial
judge almost always favored the prosecution. Moreover,
because there were grounds to believe even before the trial
started, that the judge would favor the prosecution, the judge
should have disqualified himself based on his close family
connections to the Queens District Attorney‟s office.15 However,
one critical ruling by the trial judge stands out and appears to
have had an unusual impact on the ability of both defense
attorneys to present their case to the jury effectively. In a
surprise ruling at the close of testimony at 5 p.m. on March 5th,
the last Thursday of the trial, the judge ordered both defense
attorneys to give their closing arguments the following

2009-04153 (Queens Cnty. 2009) [hereinafter Transcript].
12. Id. at 1651-52, 1660-63, 1665-66, 1713, 1742-43.
13. Id. at 3630-34.
14. Controversial evidentiary rulings included the court‟s admission of
extensive hearsay statements, see, e.g., Brief for Appellant, app. 1113-15,
1119-20, People v. Borukhova, No. 2009-04153 (Queens Cnty. 2009)
[hereinafter Brief], the court‟s refusal to allow Borukhova to testify as to her
state of mind, see, e.g., id. at 1417, 1471-72, the court‟s barring crossexamination of police witnesses of omissions in their notes, see, e.g., id. at
1309-14, 1316-20, 1331-34, 1337, the court‟s denial of a hearing and
precluding cross-examination into the scientific basis for the fingerprint
evidence, see, e.g., id. at 1146-1158, 1159-62.
15. The trial judge‟s children held ranking positions in the Queens
District Attorney‟s office. His son was Deputy Bureau Chief of the Career
Criminal Major Crimes Bureau and his daughter was Deputy Bureau Chief
of the Economic Crimes Bureau. Id. at 86. The motion to disqualify was based
on N.Y. JUD. LAW § 14 (McKinney 1945) (prohibiting judge from presiding
over any matter where he is “interested”), and N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS.
tit. 22, § 100.3(E)(1), (c) (2006) (requiring disqualification in a proceeding “in
which the judge‟s impartiality might reasonably be questioned,” including
matters where judge has an “interest that could be substantially affected by
the proceeding”).
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morning.16 In other words, after a lengthy trial with numerous
witnesses and difficult evidentiary issues, the lawyers only had
an overnight recess to prepare their closing arguments. By
contrast, the judge allowed the prosecutor to give his closing
argument the following Monday morning.17 This ruling appears
to have taken the lawyers by surprise. It was issued after the
judge‟s law secretary had advised defense counsel earlier that
week that all summations would take place the following
Monday.18 This notification followed an acrimonious debate
between counsel and the court over whether all of the
summations could be given on Saturday or Sunday. Moreover,
to some observers in the courtroom, the judge‟s unexpected
ruling appeared to mesh with remarks he made earlier in the
trial, such as that the trial “would have to end by St. Patrick‟s
Day, March 17th—because that was the day he was going on
vacation.”19 As it turned out, the closing argument by
Borukhova‟s defense counsel, as he acknowledged, was
seriously deficient due to lack of sleep and sufficient time for
preparation.20 And the prosecutor, as noted above, had the
entire weekend to prepare his summation and respond to the
defense arguments.21
16. Brief, supra note 14, at 1479.
17. Id. at 70-71, 266-67, 1456-73, 1476-79, 1480-83.
18. Id. at 266-67, 1457-59, 1465.
19. Janet Malcolm, Iphigenia in Forest Hills, THE NEW YORKER, May 3,
2010, at 53 (journalist who covered trial quoted judge‟s comment before trial
began that trial “would have to end by St. Patrick‟s Day, March 17 th—
because that was the day he was going on vacation,” and quoted another
remark allegedly made by the judge to one of the defense attorneys that
“[t]his trial is going to be over on March 17 th because I‟m going to be sipping
piña coladas on the beach in St. Martin”). The pressure of a trial judge‟s
vacation plans on the continuation of a trial was featured in People v.
Michael, 394 N.E.2d 1134 (N.Y. 1979) (holding that trial judge‟s declaration
of mistrial because the trial could not end in time for the vacation was not
“manifestly necessary” and therefore double jeopardy protected the defendant
from being retried on robbery and rape charges). The decision by the New
York Court of Appeals rebuking the trial judge was criticized by the New
York City and County Bar Associations as unfair to the judge. The Bar
Report was subsequently criticized. See Editorial, A Disservice by the Bar,
N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 1980, at 18.
20. Brief, supra note 14, at 72.
21. See, e.g., Ferrer v. State, 718 So.2d 822 (Fla. App. 1998) (violation of
defendant‟s right to fair trial to compel defendant‟s attorney to select jury in
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The Borukhova case describes one unusual instance in
which a ruling by a trial judge almost certainly impaired the
ability of defense counsel to represent his client effectively, as
well as conferring an obviously unfair advantage on the
prosecution. However, the Borukhova case is not unique.
Judicial interference with counsel‟s representation, like the
Hydra slain by Hercules, has many heads. Some of these
interferences are idiosyncratic and defy any unifying principle.
For example, trial judges have impaired counsel‟s ability to
make independent decisions on how to present the defense by
prohibiting defense counsel from making a closing argument in
a bench trial,22 barring the defendant from giving testimony in
his own defense,23 requiring that the defendant be the first
witness called by the defense,24 barring direct examination of
the defendant,25 limiting the number of witnesses that the
defense can call,26 restricting the ability of defense counsel to
consult with his own expert,27 limiting defense access to
prospective witnesses,28 and imposing a time limit on
defendant‟s direct testimony.29 The discussion that follows
describes several broad categories of judicial interference that
may have the effect of undermining defense counsel‟s ability to
represent his client effectively.
III. Interrogation of Witnesses
One of the most common ways in which a judge can
interfere with counsel‟s effective representation is to take over
the evening when lawyer was tired and not performing at his usual level of
competency).
22. See Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 855 (1975).
23. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 47 (1987).
24. See Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 606 (1972).
25. See Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 571 (1961).
26. See United States v. Gray, 105 F.3d 956, 963 (5th Cir. 1997); United
States v. Holmes, 44 F.3d 1150, 1156 (2d Cir. 1995).
27. See People v. Santana, 600 N.E.2d 201, 202 (N.Y. 1992).
28. See United States v. Medina, 992 F.2d 573, 579 (6th Cir. 1993),
receded from on other grounds, United States v. Jackson-Randolph, 282 F.3d
369, 388 (6th Cir. 2002).
29. See United States v. Hay, 122 F.3d 1233, 1237 (9th Cir. 1997).
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the examination of witnesses, including both prosecution and
defense witnesses, as well as the testimony of the defendant
himself. A judge has the responsibility to take an active role in
the conduct of the trial to assure that the proceedings are
conducted in a fair, orderly, and expeditious manner. Courts
recognize that this judicial function may include the
questioning of witnesses in order to clarify the testimony, elicit
necessary facts, and facilitate the orderly and efficient progress
of the trial.30 However, given the trial judge‟s ability to
influence the jury, the judge must be extremely careful when
participating in the examination of a witness to avoid
indicating through questions, tone, or demeanor that the judge
has an opinion about the merits of the case or the credibility of
the witness.31 Even the most conscientious and wellintentioned judge may ask questions that, from her content,
manner, or tone, may suggest an opinion about the case or may
indicate an attitude with respect to the credibility of the
witness. When analyzing whether a judge overstepped the
limits in questioning witnesses, reviewing courts properly
consider the necessity for asking questions, the extent of the
interrogation, the evenhandedness in asking questions, the
manner and tone of the questions, and whether the trial was by
a judge or a jury.
A judge‟s intervention may be more necessary in a lengthy
trial involving complex issues in order to clarify testimony and
expedite the proceedings.32 Moreover, if a witness‟s testimony
is unresponsive or confusing, and counsel, either from
inexperience or lack of preparation, fails to elicit clear and
appropriate answers, it may be necessary for the judge to

30. United States v. Flying By, 511 F.3d 773, 777 (8th Cir. 2007) (court‟s
questions helped clarify witness‟s testimony); United States v. Bermea, 30
F.3d 1539, 1572 (5th Cir. 1994) (multi-defendant trial required judge‟s
intervention to expedite trial and prevent repetition).
31. Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 470 (1933) (“The influence of
the trial judge on the jury is necessarily and properly of great weight and his
lightest word or intimation is received with deference, and may prove
controlling.”) (internal citation omitted).
32. Compare Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1982) (complex and
protracted trial), with United States v. Hickman, 592 F.2d 931 (6th Cir. 1979)
(one-day trial with single issue).
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clarify the testimony.33 Further, if a witness, because of age or
physical or mental infirmity, has difficulty in understanding
questions or giving clear and responsive answers, the judge
may need to intervene to assist the witness in giving
appropriate answers.34 However, even if a judge is justified in
asking questions, a reviewing court will examine the extent of
the interrogation and its evenhandedness. Appellate courts
have actually tallied up the number of questions asked by the
judge, the number of transcript pages covered by the judge‟s
questions, and the numerical ratio between the judge‟s
questions and those of counsel.35 Although the sheer number of
questions asked by the judge may not by itself be determinative
of the judge‟s attitude about the case, it can provide some
insight into whether the judge may have conveyed an opinion
about the merits of the case. Moreover, if the judge‟s
questioning is so one-sided as to appear to favor one party, a
reviewing court will be much more likely to find error than if
the questioning, although extensive, was spread out equally
among witnesses for both sides.36
Finally, the manner and tone of the judge‟s questions are
highly relevant considerations in determining whether the
judge conveyed an opinion about the case or the credibility of
the witness. Although it is difficult for a reviewing court to
discern a judge‟s tone, mannerisms, and facial expressions from
the “cold black and white of a printed record,”37 the types of
questions and accompanying colloquy may provide an informed
33. United States v. Pisani, 773 F.2d 397, 403 (2d Cir. 1985).
34. Hickman, 592 F.2d at 933 (“It is often impossible for counsel to deal
with a difficult witness without judicial intervention.”).
35. United States v. Filani, 74 F.3d 378, 386 (2d Cir. 1996) (judge‟s
questions during defendant‟s testimony covered twenty-five percent of
transcript pages); People v. Yut Wai Tom, 422 N.E.2d 556, 564 (N.Y. 1981)
(judge asked more than 1300 questions).
36. People v. Arabadjis, 432 N.Y.S.2d 391, 393 (App. Div. 1980) (judge‟s
“„slanted‟ questioning . . . unfairly buttressed the People‟s case”); Gerichten v.
Ruiz, 435 N.Y.S.2d 783, 784 (App. Div. 1981) (judge‟s questions rehabilitated
one party‟s expert and blunted testimony of other side‟s expert); United
States v. Tilton, 714 F.2d 642, 644 (6th Cir. 1983) (judge‟s intervention in
questioning “appeared to go in both directions, affecting the defendant and
the prosecution”).
37. Pisani, 773 F.2d at 402 (internal citation omitted).
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basis for an appellate court to infer that a particular tone or
manner was expressed by the judge. Thus, appellate courts
have found that a judge‟s questions to witnesses displayed
“hostility,”39
“disbelief,”40
“skepticism,”41
ridicule,38
42
43
incredulity,
argumentativeness,
“inquisition,”44 “zeal,”45
sarcasm,46 slant,47 and aggressiveness.48 By the same token, at
least one appellate court has also noted a trial judge‟s
benevolent disposition towards a witness, interpreting the
judge‟s tone and manner as protective, reassuring, and
reinforcing.49
A good example of a judge‟s improper intrusion in
questioning a witness is People v. Ellis,50 a New York State
murder trial in which the appellate court observed that
“[t]hroughout the trial, the court assumed the function of the
prosecutor to such an extent as to deprive defendant of a fair
trial and to impair the aura of impartiality which should
surround every judicial proceeding.”51 During his direct
testimony, the defendant denied acknowledging to the police
that he owned a particular hat found by the arresting officer
that was critical to the identity of the killer.52 The trial court
interrupted defense counsel‟s examination and, by skillful
questions, transparent sarcasm, and ridicule, all but destroyed

38. Walberg v. Israel, 766 F.2d 1071, 1073 (7th Cir. 1985).
39. United States v. Cassiagnol, 420 F.2d 868, 879 (4th Cir. 1970).
40. United States v. Van Dyke, 14 F.3d 415, 420 (8th Cir. 1994).
41. United States v. Mazzilli, 848 F.2d 384, 388 (2d Cir. 1988).
42. People v. Tucker, 455 N.Y.S.2d 1, 3 (App. Div. 1982).
43. United States v. Lanham, 416 F.2d 1140, 1141 n.1 (5th Cir. 1969).
44. Knapp v. Kinsey, 232 F.2d 458, 461 (6th Cir. 1956).
45. United States v. Hoker, 483 F.2d 359, 366 n.10 (5th Cir. 1973).
46. Gayle v. Scully, 779 F.2d 802, 807 (2d Cir. 1985).
47. People v. Arabadjis, 432 N.Y.S.2d 391, 393 (App. Div. 1980).
48. Minor v. Harris, 556 F. Supp. 1371, 1383-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff’d,
742 F.2d 1430 (2d Cir. 1983).
49. Id. at 1382, 1384 (judge‟s “protective and reassuring attitude toward
the prosecution witnesses” and “coming quickly to the aid of prosecution
witnesses during cross-examination”).
50. 404 N.Y.S.2d 862 (App. Div. 1978).
51. Id. at 864.
52. Id. at 863-64.
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the defendant‟s credibility.53 Further, in an obvious effort to
blunt the effectiveness of defense counsel‟s cross-examination
of the prosecutor‟s key witness, who testified that he pleaded
guilty to a lesser crime in exchange for his testimony, the trial
judge again interrupted defense counsel‟s questioning with the
rhetorical question: “Ninety percent of those sitting in prison,
were they allowed to plead to a lesser crime than that for which
they were indicted, as far as you know?”54
A judge‟s participation in questioning may not only
damage a defendant‟s credibility, as in People v. Ellis, but may
also enhance the credibility of a prosecution witness, thereby
impliedly endorsing the prosecution‟s case and subverting the
defendant‟s case. Such conduct obviously is objectionable
because it suggests to the jury that the judge is not impartial
but holds a favorable view of the government‟s case. A judge
can undermine a defense counsel‟s cross-examination of a
government witness by questions that either rehabilitate the
witness55 or blunt a prosecution witness‟s testimony that
appeared to support the defense.56 Moreover, whereas a lawyer
is not permitted to express an opinion about the credibility of a
witness,57 it is even more egregious for a judge to do so because
such conduct adds considerable influence to the jury‟s
evaluation of the evidence. Thus, judges have disparaged the
53. Id. at 864.
54. Id. (internal citation omitted). For other prejudicial interventions,
see People v. De Jesus, 369 N.E.2d 752 (N.Y. 1977) (judge accused defense
counsel of playing “games” and “putting words in . . . (the witness‟) mouth”
(internal citation omitted)); People v. Eldridge, 542 N.Y.S.2d 65 (App. Div.
1989) (judge forced defendant to characterize prosecution witnesses as
“liars”); People v. Connor, 524 N.Y.S.2d 287 (App. Div. 1988) (judge
gratuitously advised jury that defendant was attempting to delay his trial);
People v. Iskandar, 426 N.Y.S.2d 24 (App. Div. 1980) (judge insinuated that
defendant committed crime).
55. United States v. Barnhart, 599 F.3d 737, 745 (7th Cir. 2010) (judge‟s
“attempt to bolster the prosecution‟s witness took the wind out of the sails of
the defense attorney‟s cross-examination”).
56. United States v. Filani, 74 F.3d 378, 381-82 (2d Cir. 1996) (judge‟s
follow-up questions demolished helpful concession made by prosecution
witness).
57. MODEL RULES OF PROF‟L CONDUCT R. 3.4(e) (2010) (duty of attorney
not to “state a personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, the credibility of
a witness, . . . or the guilt or innocence of an accused”).
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credibility of witnesses with outrageous remarks,58 made
gratuitous remarks that favor the prosecution,59 made
comments that have endorsed the prosecutor‟s high moral
character thereby manipulating the jury‟s sympathies for the
government,60 and have made snide and belittling comments to
defense witnesses.61
IV. Mistreatment of Counsel
A judge‟s criticism and abuse of defense counsel may be so
pronounced as to impair counsel‟s ability to effectively defend
his client. Trial judges should display patience, courtesy, and
respect toward counsel so as not to prejudice the jury by giving
an impression of the court‟s partisanship. However, judges are
only human; the pressures of a trial, or the conduct of defense
counsel, may cause even the most mild-tempered judge to vent
irritation or impatience. Although any disparaging comments
to defense counsel ideally should be suppressed, and certainly
should not be made in the jury‟s presence, some remarks may
be so intense and so frequent that they may unnerve and
demoralize counsel, impair his ability to function effectively,
and prejudice the jury against him.
A judge‟s remarks that impugn a lawyer‟s integrity are a
striking example of misconduct that often results in the
reversal of a conviction. For example, one judge admonished
defense counsel in front of the jury: “I won‟t let you tell them
rotten law.”62 Another judge interrupted counsel‟s summation
58. Minor v. Harris, 556 F. Supp. 1371, 1389 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (judge
ridiculed defendant‟s colloquial expression of young people as “dudes”), aff’d,
742 F.2d 1430 (2d Cir. 1983).
59. People v. Sprinkle, 189 N.E.2d 295, 297 (Ill. 1963) (before leading
elderly robbery victim into making courtroom identification of the defendant,
judge remarked “God bless you,” and later “I think you are marvelous”)
(internal citation omitted).
60. United States v. Assi, 748 F.2d 62, 68 (2d Cir. 1984) (referring to
prosecutor as “the distinguished Assistant United States Attorney who‟s been
handling this case before us”) (internal ciation omitted).
61. Such remarks may be the basis for disciplinary action. See, e.g., In re
Agresta, 476 N.E.2d 285 (N.Y. 1985); In re Waltemade, 409 N.Y.S.2d 989 (Ct.
Jud. 1975); In re Gorenstein, 434 N.W.2d 603 (Wis. 1989).
62. United States v. Hickman, 592 F.2d 931, 936 (6th Cir. 1979)
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to advise the jury that counsel‟s assertion was “absurd and
bordering upon a lie,” and that counsel “won‟t get away with
it.”63 As the appellate court noted, “the court‟s castigation of
counsel so discredited him in the eyes of the jury that he could
not have remained an effective spokesman for his client.”64
Another judge, in the presence of the jury, accused counsel of
“sandbagging” conduct and remarked, “I think the jury and I
are entitled to know why.”65 Equally reprehensible are a judge‟s
remarks accusing counsel of throwing up “a smoke screen,”66
“pull[ing] a filibuster,”67 playing games,68 and “putting words in
. . . (the witness‟) mouth.”69
A judge‟s remarks may also impugn counsel‟s competence.
Although a judge occasionally may find it necessary to
admonish counsel to ask proper questions, not to be repetitive,
and to adhere to proper rules of courtroom decorum, such
remarks, as well as any corrective action, should be made
outside the presence of the jury. Gratuitous reproaches about
counsel‟s ineptness in the presence of the jury can throw
counsel off balance and impair his effectiveness. Disparaging
remarks made by the judge in the jury‟s presence, such as: “I
haven‟t any right in a public trial to give [the attorney] a course
in evidence,”70 “[y]ou will have to see a lawyer, . . . if you don‟t
understand [my ruling],”71 and “I don‟t know about a defense,
but you are doing some conducting,”72 “[y]our tactics are not

(internal citation omitted).
63. United States v. Spears, 558 F.2d 1296, 1297 (7th Cir. 1977)
(internal ciation omitted).
64. Id. at 1298.
65. Spencer v. State, 543 A.2d 851, 854 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988)
(internal citation omitted).
66. United States v. Williams, 809 F.2d 1072, 1088 n.15 (5th Cir. 1987)
(internal citation omitted).
67. State v. Hammler, 312 So.2d 306, 314 (La. 1975) (internal citation
omitted).
68. People v. De Jesus, 369 N.E.2d 752, 754 (N.Y. 1977).
69. Id. (internal citation omitted).
70. United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 388 n.84 (7th Cir. 1972)
(internal citation omitted).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 387 n.83.
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correct,”73 and to “sit down and let the other attorney take over
if you don‟t know how to cross examine this man”74 are
offensive and frequently reversible error. Rebuking comments
that include sarcasm, ridicule, and personal humiliation often
lead to reversal.75 Harsh rebukes, even outside the jury‟s
presence, such as accusing counsel of “disgusting and shysterlike” behavior, can create an “embattled and prejudicial
atmosphere in the courtroom that makes a fair trial
impossible.”76
Finally, threatening counsel with disciplinary sanctions in
the presence of the jury is serious misconduct that can
undercut counsel‟s effectiveness and deprive a defendant of a
fair trial.77 Such threats might intimidate a lawyer to temper
his zealous defense of his client, and thereby undercut his
effectiveness, as well as suggest to a jury that the lawyer is
behaving unethically and thereby prejudice the jury against
the lawyer. Even threats made outside the jury‟s presence can
result in a deprivation of the right to counsel, as when a judge
chastised a court-appointed lawyer for ingratitude and “made a
thinly veiled threat not to approve [counsel‟s] fee request at the
end of the trial.”78 Obviously, such threats have the likelihood
of hampering the lawyer‟s aggressive conduct in order to curry
favor with the judge.
V. Interfering With Attorney-Client Consultation
Another way that a judge can undermine a defendant‟s
right to counsel is by interfering with his ability to consult with
his attorney during the trial. A judge‟s order barring such
73. Bursten v. United States, 395 F.2d 976, 984 (5th Cir. 1968) (internal
citation omitted).
74. Id.
75. United States v. Pisani, 773 F.2d 397, 403 (2d Cir. 1985) (criticizing
judge‟s “unnecessary barbs” at counsel, which were made with “distressing
frequency”); People v. Johns, 415 N.Y.S.2d 71 (App. Div. 1979) (noting court‟s
antagonistic and disparaging attitude toward counsel).
76. United States v. Boatner, 478 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1973) (internal
citation omitted).
77. United States v. Kastenbaum, 613 F.2d 86, 88-89 (5th Cir. 1980).
78. Walberg v. Israel, 766 F.2d 1071, 1075 (7th Cir. 1985).
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consultation often occurs when a defendant is on the witness
stand. The justification for such a non-consultation order does
not rest on the assumption that defense counsel will engage in
unethical coaching; rather, such orders are justified on the
theory that when a defendant becomes a witness, he has no
constitutional right to consult with his lawyer while he is
testifying.79 However, in the leading case of Geders v. United
States,80 the Supreme Court ruled a trial judge‟s order directing
the defendant not to consult with his attorney during an
overnight recess, called while the defendant was on the witness
stand, violated the defendant‟s Sixth Amendment right to the
assistance of counsel. The Court reasoned that normal
consultation between a lawyer and his client during an
overnight recess would ordinarily embrace matters that go well
beyond the defendant‟s own testimony, such as the availability
of other witnesses, trial tactics, and the possibility of a plea
bargain, but the judge‟s order effectively barred discussion of
all of these matters.81 The judge‟s order easily could have been
framed to limit discussion with respect to the defendant‟s
testimony only. Moreover, denial of a brief recess during the
trial to permit counsel to confer with his client over whether
the defendant should take the stand constituted an abuse of
discretion; such a brief recess would not obstruct orderly trial
procedure.82
Courts reviewing the permissibility of orders barring a
defendant‟s ability to consult with his attorney during other
trial recesses, such as weekends, luncheon recesses, and
recesses during the trial day, usually make a distinction
between lengthy and brief recesses.83 For example, in Perry v.
Leeke,84 the Supreme Court limited Geders, holding that an
order directing the defendant not to consult with his attorney
79. See Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 281 (1989).
80. 425 U.S. 80 (1976).
81. Id.
82. See People v. Spears, 474 N.E.2d 1189 (N.Y. 1984).
83. Compare People v. Joseph, 646 N.E.2d 807 (N.Y. 1994) (error to bar
communication during weekend recess), with People v. Enrique, 600 N.E.2d
229 (N.Y. 1992) (no error to ban consultation during luncheon recess called
during cross-examination of defendant).
84. 488 U.S. 272 (1989).
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during a fifteen-minute recess declared after the defendant
completed his direct examination did not violate the
defendant‟s right to counsel. As the Court observed: “[W]hen a
defendant becomes a witness, he has no constitutional right to
consult with his lawyer while he is testifying.”85 Even during a
short recess, a judge could permit a defendant to consult with
his attorney about trial issues generally, but bar discussion
concerning his ongoing testimony.86
A judge‟s interference with consultation may take other
forms, such as requiring that the defendant communicate with
his lawyer only in writing while court is in session.87 Nonconsultation orders may also include orders barring defense
consultation with prospective witnesses. In one New York case,
People v. Santana,88 the trial court barred defense counsel from
discussing the testimony of the prosecution‟s expert with his
own expert until after the prosecution‟s expert completed his
testimony. This unusual ruling, according to the New York
Court of Appeals, presented defense counsel with a Hobson‟s
choice—either he could consult with his own expert and forgo
calling his expert as his witness, or refrain from consultation
and be free to call him in rebuttal.89 In reversing, the Court of
Appeals found that the prejudice to defense counsel‟s ability to
effectively defend his client was incalculable.90
VI. Refusal to Grant a Recess or Continuance
A judge‟s refusal to grant a recess or continuance may also
impair a lawyer‟s ability to represent a client effectively.
Ordinarily, the decision to grant or deny a recess or
continuance lies within a judge‟s broad discretion to administer
the trial, and such decisions constitute error only when there is

85. Id. at 281.
86. People v. Stroner, 432 N.E.2d 348, 351 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982).
87. Moore v. Purkett, 275 F.3d 685 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding this practice
to be a violation of the defendant‟s rights).
88. 600 N.E.2d 201 (N.Y. 1992).
89. Id. at 204.
90. Id. at 205.
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a clear abuse of discretion.91 As a general rule, a trial judge‟s
unreasonable and arbitrary insistence upon expedition in the
face of a reasonable and good faith request for an adjournment
usually constitutes an abuse of discretion.92 The most critical
factor bearing on whether the denial of a request for a
continuance constitutes error is whether the defendant
suffered prejudice.93 Without establishing how the denial
impacted the defendant‟s ability to prove his case, the ruling
denying an adjournment probably will be sustained.94
Although a judge should not tolerate chronic
procrastination and irresponsibility on the part of a lawyer,
requests for continuances are often made in good faith and not
for lack of due diligence. For example, where a defendant
charged with drug crimes sought a continuance after a codefendant changed his story fifteen hours before trial to
implicate the defendant in two prior drug transactions, the
judge‟s denial of a continuance was a clear abuse of
discretion.95 The change in the co-defendant‟s testimony was
unforeseen and defense counsel had virtually no time to
prepare for it.96 Moreover, the dramatic change in testimony
conflicted sharply with the witness‟s prior statements, which
portrayed the defendant as a reluctant participant.97 In other
contexts, the denial of a request for an adjournment based on
the illness of a party, witness, or counsel may be an abuse of
discretion when the request is made in good faith and there is a
showing that prejudice will result from a denial.98 Moreover,
when a fundamental right is involved, such as securing the
attendance of a material witness,99 obtaining new counsel,100 or
91. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1983); United States v. Edwards,
101 F.3d 17, 19 (2d Cir. 1996).
92. United States v. Rodriguez Cortes, 949 F.2d 532, 545 (1st Cir. 1991).
93. See id.
94. United States v. Maybusher, 735 F.2d 366, 369 (9th Cir. 1984).
95. United States v. Heron, 564 F.3d 879, 882-83 (7th Cir. 2009).
96. Id. at 882.
97. Id. at 883.
98. See, e.g., Virgin Islands v. Charleswell, 115 F.3d 171, 175 (3d Cir.
1997).
99. Pazden v. Maurer, 424 F.3d 303 (3d Cir. 2005) (denial of continuance
in a complex fraud trial to allow defense counsel to adequately prepare and

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss2/1

16

576

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:2

permitting the attorney to consult with his client over whether
the defendant should testify,101 a judge‟s refusal to grant a brief
delay may be an abuse of discretion, and a violation of the
Sixth Amendment and the right to a fair trial.
When delays are requested to secure the attendance of
witnesses, counsel must demonstrate both that he made a good
faith effort to secure the witness‟s attendance prior to
requesting the adjournment, and that the witness would
provide favorable and material evidence.102 When a defendant
has been given ample opportunity to protect his interests, such
as having already been granted several adjournments, the
refusal of a judge to further accommodate counsel ordinarily
will be upheld.103 Similarly, when a request is made for an
adjournment to secure new counsel, or to give present counsel
more time to prepare, the decision to grant or deny the request
will be evaluated in light of the reasons for the request, the
good faith and diligence of the party, and the resulting
prejudice from the refusal of the judge to accede to the
request.104 Finally, as noted above, denying a request for a
continuance because defense counsel was surprised by
unexpected evidence is improper only when the lawyer can
show that the situation was unforeseen, and that prejudice
resulted.105

interview 560 witnesses, especially in light of the government‟s dilatory
compliance with discovery obligations, violated defendant‟s Sixth
Amendment right to counsel); People v. Walker, 813 N.Y.S.2d 600 (App. Div.
2006) (denial of request for a forty-five minute recess to produce an alibi
witness deprived defendant of fundamental right to defend himself).
100. United States v. Santos, 201 F.3d 953 (7th Cir. 2000) (arbitrary
denial of continuance to retain counsel of choice violated Sixth Amendment).
101. People v. Spears, 474 N.E.2d 1189 (N.Y. 1984).
102. Singleton v. Lefkowitz, 583 F.2d 618, 623 (2d Cir. 1978); People v.
Belotti, 563 N.Y.S.2d 510 (App. Div. 1990).
103. United States v. Brand, 80 F.3d 560 (1st Cir. 1996); People v.
Singleton, 361 N.E.2d 1003 (N.Y. 1977).
104. Bland v. Cal. Dep‟t of Corrs., 20 F.3d 1469 (9th Cir. 1994) (denial of
continuance to substitute new counsel was an abuse of discretion and
violation of Sixth Amendment).
105. United States v. Heron, 564 F.3d 879 (7th Cir. 2009).
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Restrictions on Counsel‟s Summation

Judicial interference with effective representation may
also occur, as in the Borukhova case, when a judge imposes
unwarranted and burdensome restrictions on counsel‟s
summation. Such interference most often occurs when the
judge imposes time limits on the attorney‟s summation.
Although a judge has an obligation to use judicial time
efficiently, an undue emphasis on speed can deprive a
defendant of a fair trial and effective assistance of counsel.
Imposing unreasonable time constraints on counsel‟s closing
argument can be an abuse of discretion, as well as an
infringement on defendant‟s right to counsel, when the court‟s
order prevents competent counsel from having sufficient time
to fully and completely present her defense to the jury and
develop plausible legal arguments supported by the facts.
Factors bearing on the appropriateness of the trial judge‟s time
limitations are the length and complexity of the trial, the
number of defendants, the number of witnesses, and the
potential punishment. Thus, a thirty-minute limitation in a
murder case was found to be unreasonable,106 as was a onehour limitation in a capital murder trial.107 However, when
potentially complex issues are not seriously disputed, or do not
require elaborate presentation, it is less likely that an abuse of
discretion will be found.108
In addition to time constraints, abuse of discretion has
been found from a trial court‟s restrictions on jury argument in
the following: disallowing counsel to argue proper inferences
from the evidence,109 refusing to allow counsel to argue points
of law that are included in the judge‟s charge,110 refusing to

106. Stockton v. State, 544 So.2d 1006 (Fla. 1989).
107. Collier v. State, 705 P.2d 1126 (Nev. 1985).
108. See United States v. Okoronkwo, 46 F.3d 426 (5th Cir. 1995).
109. United States v. Tory, 52 F.3d 207, 211 (9th Cir. 1995).
110. United States v. Hall, 77 F.3d 398, 401 (11th Cir. 1996), abrogated
on other grounds by Hunter v. United States, 559 F.3d 1188, 1190 (11th Cir.
2009) (court determined that carrying a concealed weapon is not a violent
felony and also is not a crime of violence pursuant to the Sentencing
Guidelines).
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allow more than one counsel to address the jury,111 refusing to
allow counsel to reserve his opening argument until the
prosecution has completed its case,112 and forcing defense
counsel to complete his closing argument before a recess as a
sanction for purportedly delaying the trial.113
VIII. Restrictive Evidentiary Rulings
Evidentiary rulings may be the most pivotal events in a
trial. A trial judge enjoys considerable discretion in ruling on
the admissibility of evidence. When a trial court abuses its
discretion, error is committed, and, if sufficiently harmful, may
result in reversal of a conviction. Rulings on evidence naturally
will affect the ability of counsel to represent his client
effectively, but such rulings are the types of routine trial events
that ordinarily do not raise issues of ineffectiveness. However,
evidentiary rulings that exclude critical defense evidence are
usually reviewed more closely than rulings that admit relevant
prosecution evidence, and such exclusionary rulings may
implicate Sixth Amendment concerns.114 This is particularly so
with respect to rulings that exclude relevant scientific or other
technical defense proof.115 Thus, excluding psychiatric
testimony when a defendant‟s mental state is a crucial issue
obviously impairs effective representation,116 and may be an
abuse of discretion. A judge‟s exclusion of testimony on the
issue of identification may create the same problem.117
Moreover, discretion in making evidentiary rulings must be
applied evenhandedly. Thus, a judge‟s exclusion of an expert‟s
testimony for the defense while allowing an expert‟s testimony
111. State v. Mitchell, 365 S.E.2d 554 (N.C. 1988).
112. United States v. Hickman, 592 F.2d 931 (6th Cir. 1979).
113. United States v. Diharce-Estrada, 526 F.2d 637 (5th Cir. 1976).
114. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) (application of state
evidence rule that denied defendant the ability to present crucial testimony
violated due process).
115. United States v. Rahm, 993 F.2d 1405 (9th Cir. 1993) (reversible
error to exclude expert‟s psychological testimony that defendant had
difficulties with visual perception).
116. United States v. McBride, 786 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1986).
117. Bowden v. McKenna, 600 F.2d 282 (1st Cir. 1979).
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for the prosecution on the same issue is an abuse of
discretion.118
The imposition of sanctions against the defense for
violating discovery rules also may seriously impede effective
representation. Thus, in Taylor v. Illinois,119 the Supreme
Court ruled that a judge‟s preclusion of defense testimony of an
alibi witness as a sanction for the attorney‟s discovery violation
did not violate the defendant‟s Sixth Amendment right to
compulsory process, especially since the violation appeared to
be willful and the proffered evidence may have been perjury.
Courts relying on Taylor to exclude defense evidence have
emphasized that the discovery violation was deliberate,120
involved dilatory tactics,121 related to evidence whose probative
value was minimal,122 or evinced conduct prejudicial to the
judicial process.123 Although such rulings can severely
prejudice the defendant by depriving him of critical evidence,
appellate courts routinely allow the trial judge wide latitude in
policing discovery violations and find error only when the
discretion is abused.124
A judge also burdens effective representation when he
makes rulings that deprive a defendant of the basic tools
necessary to conduct an adequate defense. Transcripts of
earlier proceedings are a vital tool for conducting an effective
defense.125 As is the assistance of experts or investigators
provided to an indigent defendant at the government‟s
expense.126 Thus, for example, when the assistance of an expert
118. United States v. Sellers, 566 F.2d 884 (4th Cir. 1977).
119. 484 U.S. 400 (1988).
120. Bowling v. Vose, 3 F.3d 559, 561 (1st Cir. 1993).
121. Tyson v. Trigg, 50 F.3d 436 (7th Cir. 1995).
122. Guam v. Palomo, 35 F.3d 368, 374 (9th Cir. 1994).
123. United States v. Johnson, 970 F.2d 907, 910 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
124. LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663 (9th Cir. 2000) (preclusion of
relevant evidence as sanction for discovery violation violated defendant‟s
Sixth Amendment right to counsel); Commonwealth v. Dranka, 702 N.E.2d
1192 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998) (abuse of discretion to preclude testimony of
defense expert based on defense counsel‟s untimely disclosure of witness‟s
identity).
125. See Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226 (1971); People v. Coleman,
611 N.E.2d 285 (N.Y. 1993).
126. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
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will be crucial to a defendant‟s ability to present his defense,
and when a proper showing has been made, a defendant is
constitutionally entitled to such assistance.127 A defendant has
the burden of establishing with reasonable particularity the
necessity for such assistance, and the court‟s determination is
reviewed for abuse of discretion.128
IX. Restricting Cross-Examination
The Sixth Amendment‟s Confrontation Clause guarantees
a defendant the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses.129
However, the right of cross-examination, whether analyzed as
a constitutional or evidentiary matter, is not absolute. As a
constitutional matter, a judge must afford defense counsel “a
reasonable chance to develop the whole picture.”130 Assuming
constitutional concerns have been satisfied, a judge is afforded
broad discretion to impose reasonable limitations on crossexamination based on concerns of harassment, prejudice,
confusion of issues, witness safety, or interrogation that is
repetitive or only marginally relevant.131 As the Supreme Court
has observed, counsel must be allowed “an opportunity for
effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is
effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense
might wish.”132 However, although a judge has broad discretion
to regulate cross-examination, when the judge curtails
questioning into important and relevant facts bearing on the
trustworthiness of crucial testimony, such interference may
deprive a defendant of the effective assistance of counsel.
One of the most important objectives of cross-examination
127. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 323 n.1 (1985) (finding
refusal to appoint ballistics and fingerprint experts based on a general
statement of request did not violate defendant‟s rights); Castro v. Ward, 138
F.3d 810, 826-27 (10th Cir. 1998) (upholding denial of investigative
assistance based on defendant‟s failure to show the necessity of an
investigator for an adequate defense).
128. United States v. Nichols, 21 F.3d 1016, 1018 (10th Cir. 1994).
129. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16 (1974).
130. United States v. Laboy-Delgado, 84 F.3d 22, 28 (1st Cir. 1996).
131. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986).
132. Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985).
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is the opportunity of counsel to probe a witness‟s motivation for
testifying, including possible biases, prejudices, or ulterior
motives.133 A judge‟s prohibition or substantial curtailment of
cross-examination into facts indicative of a witness‟s bias is
likely to be a constitutional error. Thus, in Delaware v. Van
Arsdall,134 it was held constitutionally impermissible for the
trial judge to bar all cross-examination of a prosecution witness
about a prior criminal charge that had been dismissed by the
government in an effort to obtain the witness‟s cooperation and
testimony. Similarly, in Davis v. Alaska,135 it was
constitutional error for the trial judge to bar defense counsel
from cross-examining the government‟s principal witness as to
the reason for his cooperation. However, a judge acts within his
discretion when he limits cross-examination that is
cumulative,136
repetitive,137
of
marginal
relevance,138
139
140
harassing,
or otherwise improper.
Assessing the
seriousness of the restriction, the reviewing judge should
consider factors such as the importance of the witness‟s
testimony, whether the testimony was cumulative, the
existence of contradictory evidence on material points, the
extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and the
strength of the evidence against the defendant.141 When a judge
does afford counsel some latitude in exploring issues germane
to the case, it probably cannot be said that the judge interfered
unduly in the effectiveness of counsel‟s representation.
X.

Conclusion

A lawyer‟s ineffective representation of a client may be
attributable to a lawyer‟s own personal failings. However,
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
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Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 231 (1988).
475 U.S. 673.
415 U.S. 308 (1974).
United States v. Mitchell, 49 F.3d 769, 779 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
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impairment of the right to effective assistance of counsel may
also come from a trial judge‟s conduct, and can take many
forms and occur in varying circumstances. It is therefore
difficult to formulate clear principles to cover all of the various
situations in which a judge can undermine effective
representation. The Borukhova case is only the most recent
illustration of the way a ruling of a judge—forcing the lawyer
to sum up his case without giving the lawyer adequate time for
preparation—may deprive the defendant of the effective
representation by his attorney.
The discussion in this Article of the various types of
conduct and rulings that a trial judge may make that impede
effective advocacy is not intended to suggest that there may not
be other examples of judicial interference. Trial judges have
extremely broad discretion to administer the trial, but must do
so impartially and with deference to a defendant‟s right to the
competent assistance of his attorney. When a judge makes
rulings that: (1) undermine counsel‟s effectiveness and ability
to be the guiding hand to his client that the Sixth Amendment
contemplates; (2) have no clear justification for the judge‟s
intervention; or (3) cause the defendant to suffer prejudice from
the judge‟s interference, then a reviewing court usually will
reverse the conviction and conclude that the judge abused his
discretion and infringed on the defendant‟s right to a fair trial
and the effective assistance of his counsel.
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